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Jeu d’écarts: Derrida’s Descartes 
 
Stephen Thomson 
University of Reading 
 
...défaite d’une réponse bifide, écartant d’elle-même la question...1 
 
...tout écart contient sa simulation...2 
 
Critical commentary has linked Derrida with écarts from the first: Écarts, that is to 
say, was the title of the very first collection of critical essays devoted to Derrida’s 
work.3 It is arguably only quite recently, however, in Sean Gaston’s The Impossi-
ble Mourning of Jacques Derrida, that the theme has received its most sustained 
treatment, tracing the twists and turns of the word ‘écart’, and the gaps and 
swerves of the trace in Derrida’s writing. Perhaps the most tantalising moment in 
Gaston’s meditation comes in a brief section where he considers how we might 
read des écarts in ‘dEsCARTeS’.4 I say ‘tantalising’ because Gaston’s typography 
also suggests the converse possibility; that ‘Descartes’ might be disseminated in 
Derrida’s ‘écarts’. Yet it seems for Gaston this reversal is not on the cards: far 
                                                 
1 Jacques Derrida, ‘La double séance’, in La dissémination (Paris: Seuil, 1972), p.203. 
2 Paul Valéry, ‘Suite’, in Tel quel (Paris: Gallimard, 1996; repr. 2008), p.467. 
3 Lucette Finas, Sarah Kofman, Roger Laporte, Jean-Michel Rey, Écarts: Quatre essais à propos de 
Jacques Derrida (Paris: Fayard, 1973). 
4 Sean Gaston, The Impossible Mourning of Jacques Derrida (London: Continuum, 2006), pp.86-88. 
  
from blazing a trail for dissemination and the trace, Gaston’s ‘dEsCARTeS’ is anx-
ious to have done with his écarts so as to shore up his name. So, Descartes’s claim, 
in the Discours de la méthode, that his move to Amsterdam allowed him to live a 
life as solitary and retired as in ‘les déserts les plus écartés’, is a way of placing ‘a 
gap between himself and Paris’ and so finding a ‘place where the gap works’. 
He wages [sic] everything on a gap that works: on a clean break, on a total separation, on 
a name that does not wander, depart, deviate or swerve, on a gap whose edges are always 
clear and distinct. 
In effect, the move to a remote place whose language and ways are strange to him 
provides Descartes with a mundane sort of remoteness and solitude which serve to 
displace a more radical self-separation. Différance is rationalised as a series of dif-
ferences cantonned within a distinctly bounded location, placeable on the map of a 
rational, calculable, manageable geometry. Gaston goes on to underscore Des-
cartes’s predilection for what is ‘clear and distinct’ by citing an apt passage from 
the Meditations. Once Descartes has thus effectively convicted himself out of his 
own mouth, Gaston leaves him, save to mention in passing his reliance on the 
name of God (Gaston 92).  
Descartes, it seems, is an open and shut case. But there is something trou-
bling in this. Can it really be deconstruction that comes to rest in a verdict that is 
itself so clear and distinct; or, for that matter, that proceeds from such clear and 
distinct premises, by assuming that Descartes just is his declared theses and, con-
  
versely, that he has no part in the disseminative potential of ‘déserts...écartés’? 
What can deconstruction want with such a wholly orthodox, which is to say wholly 
Cartesian, Descartes? This is not to say there is anything remarkable in this move; 
quite the contrary. The disregard to which the father of modern philosophy suc-
cumbs is in itself quite familiar: it is the contempt that familiarity breeds, and 
which seeks and finds nothing in ‘Descartes’ that would resist compression into the 
tiny volume of the adjective ‘Cartesian’. This is, perhaps, one of the most common 
and convenient of gestures in writing on Modern philosophy. But it is surely not 
the sort of thing we associate with Derrida.  
And, indeed, as Michel Lisse points out, albeit in a footnote, Derrida has 
called, in his paper ‘La langue et le Discours de la méthode’,5 for a re-reading of 
Descartes that would precisely not reduce his text to what a Cartesian tradition has 
made of him.6 Similarly, for Hassan Melehy one of the virtues of ‘Cogito et his-
toire de la folie’ is that it allows us to read aspects of Descartes ‘that escape the in-
stitution of philosophy in which Descartes subsists’.7 In such remarks one might 
even glimpse the possibility of a deconstructive Descartes; a reading of his text that 
would keep open the écart between its incipiently orthodox and its more errant as-
pects. Indeed, Dalia Judovitz goes some way towards such a thing in her reading of 
                                                 
5 Jacques Derrida, ‘La langue et le Discours de la méthode’, in Recherches sur la philosophie et le lan-
gage, 3 (1983), 35-51. 
6 Michel Lisse, ‘Déconstructions’, in Etudes françaises 38:1-2 (2002), 59-76, p.68. 
7 Hassan Melehy, Writing Cogito: Montaigne, Descartes, and the Institution of the Modern Subject (Alba-
ny: State University of New York Press, 1997), p.42. 
  
‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’, suggesting ways in which Descartes’s recourse to 
fiction, fable, and feint in the constitution of truth and certainty might prompt Der-
ridean questions of supplementarity. And yet, at the close, Descartes disappears, 
and it is in ‘Nietzsche’s footsteps’ that we are to see Derrida following.8 It is as if, 
when it comes to the crucial question of filiation, we cannot quite credit  the name 
of Descartes as a deconstructive antecedent, even where he has done much of the 
heavy lifting in the course of analysis.  
What I propose in this essay is not a deconstructive reading of Descartes, 
though the bones of something of the sort will emerge in the course of exploration. 
Rather it is the place of ‘Descartes’, as a name and as a force, in Derrida’s writing 
that I want to track. This place or role may indeed seem peripheral, subservient to 
the needs of more urgent discussion, often relating to a Kant, a Hegel, or a 
Heidegger. Yet, given everything that Derrida has done to complicate our ideas of 
genealogy, succession, and supersession, ought we not to be a little suspicious of 
this? What follows is by no means a complete survey of Descartes’s appearances in 
Derrida’s writing. Notably, there is simply not space to do justice to the seminars 
of 2001-2003 published as La bête et le souverain (2008-10). This is a pity. For the 
winding, looping form of the seminars, as much as the themes they invoke, marks 
an intensification in an engagement with Descartes whose earlier stages I will 
                                                 
8 Dalia Judovitz, ‘Derrida and Descartes: Economizing Thought’, in Continetnal Philosophy II: Derrida and 
Deconstruction ed. by Hugh J. Silverman (London: Routledge, 1989), pp.39-56. 
  
chart, up to L’animal que donc je suis (2006). In their delays and anticipations, the 
seminars thematise and perform the sorts of deconstructive move that hope to foil, 
or as they say in French outplay (déjouer), the prescribed, calculable sequences of 
method and the assurance of a map, but in ways that bring these moves into the 
most intimate and uncomfortable proximity with the very method and mastery de-
construction hopes to escape. It has perhaps never been clearer than in these semi-
nars to what extent mastery is the risk of deconstruction. As I hope to show, Des-
cartes has always been, in Derrida, an exemplary name for both sides of this dou-
ble bind; and the ritual sacrifice of one side so as to expropriate the other is only 
one of the shortest roads by which the most patient and attentive deconstruction 
may fall into a facile mastery. I will work my way towards these ‘écarts’ in Des-
cartes and the Cartesian, and touch briefly on the problem of the ‘carte’, or map. 
But first I must begin with something in appearance more conclusive. 
 
Donc 
In L’animal que donc je suis (2006), Derrida claims, on two separate occasions and 
in almost the same fastidious wording, that the word ‘donc’ was a late addition to 
the title.9 One may believe this, or not: the repetition of the claim does not neces-
sarily bear witness to its candour. At any rate, it is rather late in the day, on the 
                                                 
9 Jacques Derrida, L’animal que donc je suis (Paris: Galile, 2006), pp.82, 107. 
  
second occasion, that Derrida finally spells out why he added this ‘donc’: it was, 
he says, designed not to commemorate Descartes, but to summon him to court; ‘à 
faire comparaître Descartes’ (107-8). Such a direct, ad hominem, judicial summons 
is unusual in Derrida’s writing. But, as it is a question of animals, the prima facie 
case against Descartes may well seem unanswerable. As Derrida says, Descartes 
did all he could not to be ‘un philosophe animalier’; an ‘animal philosopher’, in the 
sense that we have animal painters (L’animal 106-7). As everyone knows, the ‘Co-
gito’—je pense, donc je suis—categorically excludes animals, as automata lacking 
the reasonable soul needed to think, and therefore be. For Derrida, this exclusion is 
crucial because it is the place where the grounding of metaphysics in the human 
pretention to absolute difference and sovereignty, which so preoccupies him in his 
later writing, stages itself with exemplary clarity. 
For these very reasons, however, there is something odd about the timing of 
this arraignment, halfway through the book. By this stage, Derrida has already 
summoned and dismissed Descartes numerous times, often summarily. Once one 
has, for instance, brought into question Alice’s ‘très cartésien’ proposition that one 
cannot speak to a cat because it cannot respond (L’animal 24), is the verdict really 
in doubt? And, for that matter, just by affirming the animal that therefore I am, 
Derrida’s title can scarcely not be a challenge to Descartes. So, when the summons 
finally arrives, it is to attend what might appear, were it not a matter of such a 
  
rogue as Descartes, a show trial; an ostentatious form of due process to deliver a 
verdict already long settled. There is, nevertheless, Derrida insists, a serious, per-
haps even a methodological, point to this delay. The first time ‘donc’ is trailed, 
some thirty or forty pages before the arraignment, it is expressly as a path we will 
have to go down more than once; as something that must take its time: ‘cette dé-
marche devrait être suivie’ (L’animal 82). Of course, my manner of proceeding 
(démarche) should always be steady and thorough (suivie) when on the trail of a 
big beast; none more than ‘l’animal que donc je suis’, the animal that therefore I 
follow. Here Derrida practises a slight gap or swerve in the fabric of ‘je suis’, be-
tween the verbs être and suivre, being and following; or, as he later glosses it, be-
tween the immobility of being, and the ‘breathless hunt’ with which we must trail 
an animal or a question (L’animal 112). This écart in ‘je suis’ also brings us back 
to ‘donc’, and reminds us why we are on its trail. For it is precisely ‘donc’, and its 
haste to conclude, that falls between the two senses of ‘je suis’.  
This is also why the key evidence in the arraignment is expressly not one of 
the famous instances of the Cogito, but a less well-known letter of 1638 on the an-
imal-machine. The letter, Derrida suggests, ‘resonates’ more with this ‘donc’. Well 
may ‘donc’ resonate, for it does not figure, literally, in the letter. What Derrida’s 
anlyses do, nonetheless, show is that Descartes’s judgement of unthinking animal 
‘reaction’ as categorically unequal to human ‘response’, does not rest on the sup-
  
posed testimony (témoignage) of the senses or understanding to which the letter 
appeals, but rather predetermines that testimony. ‘Donc’, thus, ‘resonates’ in the 
silence of a question begged, or a judgement concluded in advance and never in 
doubt; a judgement that is ‘à la fois une proposition judicative et un verdict’ 
(‘L’animal’ 117-18).  
What Descartes is thus guilty of is a sort of summary justice towards ani-
mals. The case may seem quite damning. The verdict, however, potentially re-
bounds on the very process that delivers it. It is not just that the decision to sub-
poena Descartes is, as I have already suggested, unusually forceful. The ostenta-
tious delay in staging the trial may imply, as much as patient and scrupulous in-
quiry, a certain assurance that inquiry will get there in the end. We may, indeed, be 
at the very point, which Derrida evokes in the first volume of The Beast and the 
Sovereign, where the writing strategies called upon to perform a ‘déconstruction 
lente et différenciée’—one that would avoid precipitate judgement and give itself 
time to take stock of what happens (ce qui arrive) along the way—threaten to col-
lapse into their opposite. For when I say (deploying the full cunning of a verse of 
La Fontaine) I will show presently that the reason of the stronger is always better, 
the demonstration is always already made, insofar as ‘le fait même de différer, de 
m’autoriser à différer’ already evinces ‘la raison du plus fort’ (Bête I 20, 113-17). 
The theme of judicial violence is thus closely related to a certain professorial vio-
  
lence. Or, perhaps, a magisterial violence: a mastery to which magister and magis-
trate alike are prone. It is a violence, what is more, from which deconstruction is 
not necessarily exempt; least of all when it makes a frontal attack on mastery. 
Should we, then, read Derrida’s arraignment of Descartes straight, as a show 
of force? Does the summary justice of the accused justify the summary justice of 
the process? The ambient view of Descartes might, as I have suggested, allow the 
problem to pass without notice. But such an exemption would remain an oddly un-
Derridean move. In any case, another moment of summary justice in L’animal 
might give us pause. Just before ‘donc’ is trailed for the first time, Derrida invokes 
the hoary topos of Descartes as the ‘père présumé de la philosophie française’ 
(L’animal 81). The mastery at stake here, however, is not so much that of the fa-
ther as that of the sons. Derrida mischievously aligns Descartes’s paternity with 
that of the mythical primal father whose sacrifice institutes equality amongst 
brothers. Insofar as Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, and Lacan found their systems on a 
rejection— implicit or explicit, summary or thorough—of the Cogito, they effect a 
ritual sacrifice of Descartes. But their fate is to become ‘re-pères’ of ‘une topologie 
générale’ that places them in a certain relation to the animal and the world. Their 
ambition was (presumably) to become landmarks or milestones (repères) in a 
steadily-unfolding line of philosophical development. But the hyphen in ‘re-pères’ 
spoils the line, making them repeats of the father, so that even their thoughts ‘ap-
  
paremment les moins cartésiennes’ may be in ‘la filiation du cogito cartésien’. 
Summoning the father only to dismiss him is thus a way of preserving his spirit. 
Derrida suggests that this kinship occurs ‘irresistibly’, and often in the manner of 
‘une dénégation symptomatique’ (L’animal, 81). What is irresistible and sympto-
matic may only be the acting-out that is disavowal’s self-punishment. But it may 
also be the urge to disavow in the first place. If the latter is true, it may follow that 
leaving the vicious circle of ‘la filiation du cogito cartésien’ is no easy matter; per-
haps strictly impossible. 
 This is scarcely a problem that takes Derrida by surprise in L’animal que 
donc je suis, for he broaches it in one of his earliest published essays. In ‘Cogito et 
histoire de la folie’, Derrida suggests that this movement of disavowal and repeti-
tion constitutes nothing less than the historicity of philosophy. The Cogito is ex-
emplary of this, and inescapable, because it not only provides, as a proposition, a 
site of contestation, but also describes, through the narrative that frames it—the 
story of descent into hyperbolic negation, followed by ascent towards a new cer-
tainty—the process of contestation, as well the cycle of repetition that follows. Or, 
as Derrida says, the Cogito and all it symbolises ‘se disent, se rassurent et dé-
choient, s’oublient nécessairement jusqu’à leur réactivation, leur réveil dans un au-
tre dire de l’excès qui sera aussi plus tard une autre déchéance et une autre crise’ 
(‘Cogito’, 94). This symbolic dimension is what allows the Cogito to continue to 
  
function as an origin in a way that defies chronology; which emerges, indeed, from 
the failure of a certain historicism. What the sons seize upon in Descartes-the-
father is the chance of trapping an otherwise intractable conceptual circle in a de-
terminate historical moment, so that they can project themselves hopefully into a 
new line of philosophical development; only to fail; and so to set up the challenge 
for the next ‘re-père’.  
If striving to leave the circle is only a way back into it, is there any chance of 
escape? Derrida, indeed, suggests not flight, but a move in quite the opposite direc-
tion, further into the Cogito. The problem is that we do not understand Descartes’s 
‘audace folle’, his mad daring, because we are too reassured, too well-versed in 
Descartes: ‘trop rassurés, trop rompus à son schéma’. This is partly to do with the 
passage of time: it was otherwise for Descartes’s contemporaries. But what we for-
get is that Descartes’s demonstration takes us back to a point prior to any distinc-
tion between madness and reason (‘Cogito’ 86). This ‘hyperbolic point’ is not the 
only part of ‘what is known as the Cartesian Cogito’. Descartes has no sooner 
reached it than he ‘seeks to reassure himself’ in God. And it is not, in any case, 
something one could hang on to: just ‘reflecting’ and ‘communicating’, and so 
‘temporalising’ it, necessarily involves reason, and so leads onto the ‘sure’ path of 
method over ‘terre ferme’. This ‘temporalisation’ is undoubtedly part of what is 
known as the Cogito. But, Derrida insists, the Cogito is not itself, ‘ne vaut lui-
  
même’, except as the moment of intuition in which thought is attentive to itself 
(‘Cogito’ 89-90). This moment is not yet anything like a subject that could think 
about, decide, or effect anything; not even the step that would take it beyond itself. 
This step into time and onto ground thus requires a leap, underwritten by the assur-
ance of God. Equally, the demonstration requires this leap, without which the Co-
gito would remain forever stranded, apart from everything. Nevertheless, what 
constitutes Descartes’s audacity, and what Derrida values, is this hyperbolic point 
outside time, far from solid ground; an abyss, a place of pure différance, a no-
place. 
The immediate point of this reading, of course, is to refute Foucault’s read-
ing of the Cogito as the grounding for a throughly confident, effective, and self-
affirming reason that marks an epoch in his history of madness. Eliding the mad-
ness of the hyperbolic moment in favour of its sequel, Foucault is too sure of Des-
cartes’s assurance, and the consequence is that his own schema is rather too as-
sured. It is worth remembering at this point what Hassan Melehy calls the ‘Oedipal 
overtones’ of the essay (Melehy 38); that ‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’ announces 
itself expressly, albeit with great care and delicacy, as a son’s reckoning not just 
with the father hf French philosophy, but with Derrida’s erstwhile teacher, Fou-
cault, who was moreover present in the audience (‘Cogito’ 51-2). But one should 
also add that this radical, negative Descartes may serve as a corrective for the as-
  
surance of Derrida’s ‘re-pères’ more generally. In ‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’ 
itself, Husserl is accused of coming to rest more and more securely on the theme of 
presence, in ‘l’assurance profonde du sens en sa certitude’ (‘Cogito’ 93). And in 
L’animal, when Derrida praises the refusal to determine the self as ‘man’ or even 
‘reasonable animal’ in the second Meditation, as a break with tradition ‘dont on ne 
crédite pas assez souvent Descartes’, it is to reprove Heidegger (L’animal 101-2). 
Of course, Heidegger’s relation to the animal is ultimately pronounced ‘profondé-
ment cartésien’ (L’animal 201). And it may seem that this verdict and the momen-
tary commemoration of an uncredited Descartes are out of step with each other. 
But there is a sense to this, if one accepts that this negative Descartes—uncredited, 
forgotten by the sons—stands apart from ‘la filiation du cogito cartésien’. One 
might leave it at that, and simply think of this ‘Descartes’ as a typically decon-
structive invention of Derrida; the tactical deployment of a negative moment that 
spoils the line. But this would be to overlook another lineage; one, indeed, that I 
am guilty of passing over at the very start of my analysis; albeit with the slender 
justification that Derrida himself passes it over. We must, thus, retrace our steps to 
that first, thunderous ‘donc’ with which Derrida stages his summons of Descartes 
in L’animal que donc je suis. 
 
A Second Hearing 
  
Just before the summons, Derrida fleetingly suggests that the ‘donc’ of his title 
could have commemorated ‘l’Igitur de Mallarmé’ (L’animal 107). It seems, then, 
that ‘donc’ may differ, depending on which Latin synonym it translates; and that 
this ‘igitur’ would have been the more pleasant option, passed over with some re-
gret in favour of the more urgent matter of prosecuting Descartes’s ‘ergo’. We 
may, therefore, conclude that commemorating Mallarmé would have been a very 
different mater from arraigning Descartes. And a first glance at ‘La double séance’ 
may seem to confirm this, insofar as Descartes is listed, along with Plato and He-
gel, as a way-station in the tradition with which Mallarmé’s writing finally breaks. 
Mallarmé, Derrida suggests, was first to produce an idealism whose ‘idea’ was not 
determined as ‘présence de l’étant’, the presence of an existent thing (‘La double 
séance’ 221).10 Derrida underlines this difference throughout the essay by distin-
guishing Mallarmé’s writing from the Platonic-Hegelian, or from what passes from 
Plato to Hegel, or what remains in ‘l’orbite de Platon ou de Hegel’ (‘La double sé-
ance’ 235, 261, 280, 317). After the first mention, Descartes does not appear by 
name, but we may readily infer that his name is understood, subsumed into the 
itinerary. 
But is it possible that Descartes’s name has not so much disappeared as dis-
seminated? One sign of this might be the apparition of a certain gratuitous ‘donc’. 
                                                 
10 Jacques Derrida, ‘La double séance’, in La dissémination, 199-317, p.221. 
  
After a disseminative fantasia woven out of fragments of Mallarmé, Derrida invites 
us to hear an infinite phrase, suspended ‘entre SI, OR, DONC, renversant aussi 
bien son ordre d’Igitur à Un coup de dés’ (‘La double séance’ 297). In the passages 
cited, ‘SI’ and ‘OR’ are not only visible, but sonorous in the manner of dissemina-
tion, as ‘son ordre’ sounds ‘sonore’. By comparison, we have to strain to hear 
‘DONC’ in the weak sonorities of ‘conjoncture’, or ‘conjonction’, or ‘conclure’. In 
point of meaning also, next to the iridescent disseminative mobility of ‘si’ and ‘or’, 
‘donc’ is a mere monotone conjunction with a flat-footed inclination to conclude. 
Indeed, it seems thoroughly counter-disseminative, serving only to class, order, 
and immobilise. This is certainly the role it plays in some of the passages Derrida 
cites from Jean-Pierre Richard earlier in the essay (‘La double séance’  263, 278). 
Why, then, place ‘donc’ so prominently in the sequence ‘SI, OR, DONC’? And 
what is the meaning of the reversal of this sequence in Mallarmé’s later work? 
The short answer is that ‘donc’ encrypts Igitur. The eponymous protagonist 
of Mallarmé’s early, unfinished prose fable descends with candle and grimoire into 
the tombs of his ancestors, mocked by mirrors and echoes, to carry out an obscure 
ritual, involving the rolling of dice at midnight, seemingly hoping by the chance 
conjuncture of score and hour to precipitate a moment of decision—a moment in 
which I might conclude ‘igitur’. One might say, then, that Igitur aims at a conclu-
sion, albeit one that is mocked by the role of chance, and the laughter of tradition; 
  
and ultimately, perhaps, by its failure to conclude itself. The late poem ‘Un coup 
de dés jamais n’abolira le hasard’ is, as Derrida implies, conventionally read as be-
longing along the same itinerary, and possibly as bringing to completion, after a 
fashion, the unfinished work. The poem emits two propositions: in its title (itself 
strung out across the length of the poem), ‘a roll of the dice never will never abol-
ish chance’; and in its formal conclusion, ‘every thought emits a roll of the dice’. 
The drama that passes between involves a figure identified as the ‘Master’, in a 
shipwreck, poised to throw the dice. A number of traits thus reprise Igitur. But the 
theme of chance has by this time been elaborated into the play of dissemination. 
That is, Mallarmé has wrought to a fine pitch the syllabic play of OR (‘gold’, but 
also the weak disjunction that dictionaries often give as ‘but’, although in English 
the ‘now’ that marks a pause or turn in argument would often be closer to the 
mark), and SI (conditional ‘if’, fictional ‘as if’, intensifying ‘so’, emphatic affirma-
tion, ‘but yes!’; also, the seventh note of the musical scale). And at every point in 
the drama, and not just at the end of each bathetic arc of shipwreck at the bottom of 
a page, the pursuit of mastery, of necessity, springs disseminative leaks, and fritters 
itself away in all directions. DONC can be heard at most twice, and only following 
the weak sonority noted above: masterfully, in ‘cette conjonction suprême avec la 
probabilité’; and, bathetically, in ‘inférieur clapotis quelconque comme pour dis-
perser l’acte vide’. In this fall of ‘donc’, perhaps, we can see the reversal of which 
  
Derrida speaks, as certainty evaporates into the surrender to chance. In Un coup de 
dés, anything like an affirmative ‘si’ is infused with a conditional, as mysterious 
and uncertain as the chance according to which ‘NOTHING...WILL TAKE 
PLACE...BUT THE PLACE / EXCEPT...PERHAPS...A CONSTELLATION’. 
One might say, then, that Derrida’s reading of ‘SI, OR, DONC’ serves to 
mark a progressive chastening and attenuation of the conclusive pretentions of 
‘donc’. And yet, even making this argument requires us to strain our ears to hear its 
echo throughout Mallarmé’s writing. And this very insistence on ‘donc’ works to 
erode any conclusive difference between it and ‘igitur’; and maybe even to keep in 
play the ghost of a Cogito. It is tempting, then, to hear in the footnote which con-
cludes ‘La double séance’ with a virtuouso cadenza on the letter ‘i’, the echo of an 
‘ergo’.  
 Enfin le I majuscule, n’est-ce pas le Je anglais, l’ego (l’écho et glace de soi)? Les Mots 
Anglais: “I, je, Lat. ego; ice, glace;...” (p.925). Hors-texte d’Igitur: ‘écho—ego—plus-je, 
etc.’ (‘La double séance’ 317)  
This short but dense passage draws together three brief sequences—the first, Der-
rida’s own gloss; the second, the entry for ‘I’ from Mallarmé’s curious English 
primer, Les Mots Anglais (1877); and the third, a manuscript doodle cited earlier, 
and framed with Jean-Pierre Richard’s suggestion that we might read it as an ‘hors-
texte’ of Igitur’ (‘La double séance’ 307). We may draw these sequences into a sort 
of array, thus: 
  
l’ego (l’écho et glace de soi) 
I, je, Lat. ego; ice, glace;... 
écho—ego—plus-je, etc. 
Disposed thus, each line gestures towards the form of definition, and the whole to-
wards something like a syllogism. But, in the sheer excess of equivalence—with 
all these echoes and mirrors of echoes and mirrors—the machinery of equation 
gets, so to speak, carried away with itself. So the ‘glace’ of the primer—whose os-
tensible function is to translate the English ‘ice’, itself ostensibly only there to echo 
the pronunciation of ‘I’—not only echoes the ‘glace de soi’ of Derrida’s gloss, but 
mirrors its function, standing opposite ‘I’. The whole line might (with the excep-
tion of ‘Lat.’ for Latin) read ‘I, I, I, I, I’; with the sole stricture that each affirma-
tion would already be the simulacrum of itself, and the whole emptied of the trans-
formational possibility of exchange (i.e. definition) by the flatness of tautology. 
(Or, as the first line of the following paragraph says: ‘Le I (majuscule) dissémine 
d’avance l’unité de sens’.) Similarly, the ‘echo’ at the centre of Derrida’s gloss 
echoes the ‘ego’ at the centre of the two latter sequences, pointing to the oddity 
and vulnerability of that position which, in an equation, belongs not to the thing 
itself, nor even to its simulacrum, but to the sign of equivalence; i.e. ‘=’. Or, in a 
syllogism, ‘ergo’. Particularly in the case of an ‘hors-texte’—strictly, an unnum-
bered supplementary illustration intercalated in an already-bound text—of ‘igitur’, 
  
might we not, then, hear in ‘ego’ an echo of ‘ergo’?  Illustrating, thus, Igitur, the 
ego is an echo, therefore plus-I. 
Does this decryption of a strange—tautologous, supplementary—Cogito in 
Igitur seem a step too far? There are circumstantial reasons for thinking it is noth-
ing of the sort. As Derrida must know, though he does not say, Le Discours de la 
méthode was of profound importance for Mallarmé in his emergence from a 
lengthy crisis, or ‘absence cataléptique’, of which Igitur was the most notable fruit. 
Numerous letters from the late 1860s attest to this, and to the work that immediate-
ly sprang from it: ‘Retrouvant en face d’un livre toute ma pensée, je m’étais initié à 
des études (de lingistique), mon refuge au cas échéant’.11 The remains of these lin-
guistic studies, published in Divagations under the title ‘Notes sur le langage’, 
elaborate on a concept of ‘fiction’ mentioned elsewhere in the letters, and express-
ly derived from his reading of the Discours: 
Le language lui [i.e. to Descartes] est apparu l’instrument de la fiction: il suivra la 
méthode du Langage. (la déterminer) Le langage se réfléchissant. 
Enfin la fiction lui semble être le procédé même de l’esprit humain—c’est elle qui met en 
jeu toute méthode, et l’homme est réduit à la volonté.12 
This Descartes—one who embraces the reflexive return of language on itself, this 
fiction which brings into question (met en jeu) even as it stakes (met en jeu)  any 
                                                 
11 A Henri Cazalis, 31 December 1869, in Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallmiard, 1998), p.749; see also 
pp.739-40. 
12 Stéphane Mallarmé, ‘Notes sur le langage’, in Igitur-Divagations-Un coup de dés (Paris: Gallimard, 
2003), pp.66-67. 
  
method—is doubtless heterodox. But for Mallarmé the fault lies with tradition: 
‘Nous n’avons pas compris Descartes’ (‘Notes’ 67).  
Derrida must, at the very least, have read the ‘Notes’, because he rips an 
aphoristic citation from them for ‘La double séance’: ‘Toute méthode est une fic-
tion’. Ostensibly this phrase serves to underscore dissemination’s difference from 
method: ‘Pas de méthode pour elle: aucun chemin ne revient en cercle vers un 
premier pas’ (‘La double séance’ 303).13 Dissemination, in other words, does not 
share method’s assurance in a true and sure path that would pre-exist and lie out-
side a discrete, whole subject; that would not be its fiction and echo. But, as Derri-
da says, ‘cela n’exclut pas une certaine marche à suivre’. This is no more than a 
literal reading of the preceding proposition, for a ‘pas de méthode’ is also a ‘step of 
method’. Doubtless this step does not share Descartes’s confidence that he will 
find what he calls ‘le sentier [...] pour aller plus droit’, or learn to ‘voir clair en mes 
actions, et marcher avec assurance en cette vie’.14 It may, on the other hand, re-
semble the more faltering steps Descartes is obliged to take in the meantime, as he 
advances slowly and with circumspection, ‘comme un homme qui marche seul et 
dans les ténèbres’ (Discours 92). Derrdida invites us, then, to see dissemination not 
as the opposite of method, but more equivocally as a sort of not-method; one that, 
                                                 
13 On the circularity of method see also Jacques Derrida, ‘Hors livre’, in La dissémination (Paris: Seuil, 
1972), 9-67, p.42-45. 
14 René Descartes, Œuvres complètes Vol.III, Disours de la méthode et essais (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 
pp.91, 87. 
  
accepting its radical exposure to ‘la mise en jeu’—as something that, far from be-
falling the subject, constitutes it—must renounce the promise of assurance. 
Curiously enough, however, it seems that even ‘assurance’ persists; albeit, as 
a fiction, less assured. Following Mallarmé, Derrida says, literature is ‘à la fois as-
surée et menacée de ne reposer que sur elle-même, en l’air, toute seule, à l’écart de 
l’être “et, si l’on veut, seule, à l’exception de tout”’.15 In this unplaceable place that 
is suspended in mid-air, alone and beside itself (‘à l’écart de l’être’), assurance and 
risk are part of the same package. The next sentence, which is also the start of a 
new paragraph, temporalises this topic into a rhythm of fall and return: ‘Rythme, 
cadence inclinée, déclinaison, décadence, chute et retour.’ If this sounds like the 
Cogito and its sequel in ‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’, it is because that is precise-
ly what it is. Only it seems Mallarmé has incorporated the whole drama into his 
writing, without the alibi of a stunt double to take the fall for him. To be ‘à l’écart 
de l’être’ is to be elsewhere in the internal displacements of writing, which are only 
ever elsewhere, but lack the assurance of an elsewhere. In the gap between Derri-
da’s paragraphs—between the lonely, immobile, but self-displacing place of diffé-
rance, and the step into time and sequential movement—an invisible ‘donc’ thun-
ders in silence. Or perhaps it does not quite thunder. For this is a ‘donc’ stripped of 
all its confidence, reduced to the purely formal necessity of decision whenever 
                                                 
15 Jacques Derrida, ‘La double séance’, in La dissémination, 199-317, p.312. 
  
anything is put into play; whenever the dice are rolled. This is what it means to be 
‘réduit à la volonté’. 
 
Des écarts 
By now, the importance of Mallarmé’s notions of ‘référence écartée, être à l’écart, 
ou hymen’ (‘La double séance’ 273) for Derrida’s writing should be apparent. 
Wherever it is a question of remaining apart, being in two places at once, swerving 
the circle of metaphysics, or avoiding either simply affirming or rejecting method, 
we find des écarts, and a writing that wagers on swerves, dodges, and gaps. I return 
then, to the question I raised at the outset: might we not hear the name Descartes 
disseminated in all these ‘écarts’? The word recurs in Derrida’s essay on Mallar-
mé’s disciple, Paul Valéry. The essay, ‘qual quelle: les sources de Valéry’ is con-
cerned with ‘des écarts et des tours’, with the dodges and swerves, and the tricks 
and turns through which Valéry has an undivided origin—pure consciousness ‘im-
puissante à se mettre en scène’—give rise to itself. 16 The idea of a thinking thing 
unable to utter or communicate itself, yet rescued by a trick, may once more make 
us think of the drama of the Cogito in the essay ‘Cogito et histoire de la folie’. But 
this torment (Qual) of the source (Quelle)—one that is close to the concerns of ‘La 
double séance’—segues into another, seemingly more mundane one: namely Valé-
                                                 
16 Jacques Derrida, “qual quelle: les sources de Valéry’, in Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 
pp.325-63, p.337-8. 
  
ry’s ‘aversions’, those writers from whom, feeling a ‘proximité, peut-être trop 
grande’, he turned away. Or, whom he somehow kept at a distance or set aside, as 
he did Freud and ‘l’autre source écartée’, Nietzsche (362-3; emphasis mine). To 
‘écarter’ a source, in this context, means neither casual omission nor explicit rejec-
tion; nor even exactly repression.17 Perhaps we might think of Freud and Nietzsche 
as discarded, as playing cards are écartées; set aside but still in the game some-
where.  
We can glean one manner of doing this from Freud’s belated justification—
in the 1925 essay ‘Selbstdarstellung’—for his avoidance of reading Nietzsche, 
which Derrida cites in the peroration of his essay: ‘je tenais ainsi moins à la priori-
té qu’à rester libre de toute prévention’; or, in the German, which Derrida quotes in 
full, ‘an der Priorität lag mir ja weniger als an der Erhaltung meiner Unbefangen-
heit’. In English we might render this: so, getting there first mattered less to me 
than getting there on my own terms, unprejudiced and unbeholden. Derrida invites 
us to admire ‘le tour malin d’un certain igitur (ja)’ which, he remarks, suffices to 
make psychoanalysis probable from the fact of its own self-presentation 
(Selbstdarstellung). The ‘cunning twist’ of this unassuming little word ‘ja’ (so, 
thus, donc etc.) thus lies in its casual insinuation of reasonableness in what might 
otherwise seem an outrageous claim, a self-serving tautology. The trick of this igi-
                                                 
17 In passing, reference to ‘un crépuscule des demi-dieux’ (‘Une vue de Descartes’ 782), and ‘Nietzsche’, 
in person, as a signpost for philosophy’s new career as a literary genre (Cartesius redivivus 50) are 
enough to question how thoroughly Valéry set aside this source. 
  
tur is to pass off force as reason.  
But Derrida’s ‘igitur’ performs a similar trick, encrypting ‘donc’ and holding 
in reserve, or ‘écartée’, another ‘source of Valéry’. This is not to say that Valéry’s 
lifelong engagement with Descartes is occluded or denied throughout ‘qual quelle’. 
In fact Derrida expressly acknowledges it, and quotes Valéry musing what will be-
come of philosophers once they realise that they are menaced on two fronts, by 
physics and linguistics: ‘Que devient: Je pense, et que devient: Je suis?’ (‘qual 
quelle’, 349).18 This line of attack may seem hostile to Descartes, reducing the Co-
gito to an empty phrase. But, as Derrida goes on to underline, for Valéry the Cogi-
to was an empty phrase from the point of view of truth or meaning, but of enor-
mous value as ‘un coup de force’, providing a ‘mise en scène’ powerful enough to 
do without truth. The role of truth in this theatre, Derrida goes on, is as a trap for 
epigones: ‘comme un piège où des générations de fétichistes serviles viendront se 
laisser prendre à reconnaître du même coup la loi du maître, du moi René Des-
cartes’ (‘qual quelle’ 351). Can we, Derrida asks, conclude that Descartes thus suc-
ceeds—through what is ‘inimitable’ in his text, ‘timbre and style’—in reinstituting 
a sure source that had been only adventitiously ‘écartée par le jeu de la significa-
tion’? Not at all: such is ‘le risque de la mise en jeu’ (‘qual quelle’ 351-52).  
Of course, this passage specifically concerns Valéry’s reading of Descartes; 
                                                 
18 Paul Valéry, ‘Léonard et les philosophes’ (1929), in Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1957; repr. 1986), p.125. Valéry’s reference to ‘l’usure de leur premiers sens’ in the 
discussion that follows is intriguing. 
  
which, Derrida says, would seem at least uneven (inégale) to a historian of philos-
ophy. So it would be possible to wonder in what sense we are dealing with ‘Des-
cartes’. Derrida affects not to care—‘Nous nous en inquièterons peu’ (‘qual quelle’ 
350).19 And so he holds Descartes ‘à l’écart’, at a distance it is perhaps not easy to 
determine. But this Valerian Descartes, like the Mallarmean one, bears a family re-
semblance to Derrida’s Descartes more generally. It may, for one thing explain 
why Derrida glosses ‘donc’, in the two passages of L’animal already discussed, as 
‘telle conjonction à valeur plus ou moins syllogistique ou explétive’ (82, 107; em-
phasis mine) before, at the moment of the arraignment, dropping ‘syllogistic’ to 
leave only ‘expletive’ (108). In the speech of 1937 published as ‘Descartes’, Valé-
ry says trenchantly, there is no syllogism in the Cogito, just before he affirms that 
there is a ‘coup de force’.20 The notebooks assembled around the same time, and 
published in 1986 as Cartesius redivivus, expand on this. Valéry first posits the 
Cogito as a syllogism (23), but goes on to declare it as empty as one could wish 
(25); and then to demonstrate this emptiness qua tautology: ‘je rend suis inutile’ 
(26). As for ‘donc’, perhaps ‘the most mysterious of the 4 words’, it ‘designates 
not a consequence, but a sort of equivalence [égalité]’ (28). In the ‘systematic 
treatment’ of the Cogito that follows, the triple bar that stands between all Valéry’s 
                                                 
19 The standard English translation of this as ‘We will concern ourselves with this for a while’ seems to me 
to entirely misconstrue ‘peu’. See Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy trans. by Alan Bass (Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1982), p.294. 
20 Paul Valéry, Variété III, IV et V (Paris: Gallimmard, 2002; repr. 2010), p.503. 
  
permutations on ‘je pense’ and ‘je suis’, stresses the commutative nature of each 
equivalence. This is the essence of the tautology; that any term can substitute any 
other, in any direction, indifferently. The mystery of ‘donc’ is thus a little like the 
mystery of money or the Holy Ghost: it hovers over the whole game as the medium 
of tautology. As the otiose sign of a generalised redundancy, this ‘donc’ is thus 
precisely what, in French grammar, one would call ‘expletive’. 
And if this reading seems ‘inégale’—whether this means irregular in itself, 
or unequal to the picture painted bu ‘historians of philosophy’—Valéry did more 
than ‘interpret this in advance’ (‘qual quelle’ 350). Indeed, in ‘Fragment d’un Des-
cartes’ (1925), Valéry says quite simply that Descartes was not a philosopher.21 Or, 
as he says in ‘Une vue de Descartes’ (1941) is perhaps a little more nuanced. Des-
cartes has his system, but the system is not Descartes himself, ‘n’est Descartes 
même’. A system can only ‘vieillir comme vieillit une carte géographique’; age as 
a geographical map ages. But what matters to Valéry, and what makes the Discours 
‘le texte fondamental’, is his manner of expressing experiences, ambitions, and 
practical reservations in the same voice, ‘indistinctement’; without distinction.22 
Or, as he says in Cartesius redivivus, it is the ‘roman des aventures’ that excites us 
(Cartesius redivivus 43). This is why Descartes is the hero of Cartesius redivivus, 
                                                 
21 Paul Valéry, ‘Fragment d’un Descartes’, in Variété I et II (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), p.148. First published 
in NRF 1 April 1925, 825-40. 
22 Paul Valéry, ‘Une vue de Descartes’, in Variété III, IV et V (Paris: Gallimard, 2002; repr. 2010), pp.750-
51. First published in Les pages imortelles de Descartes, choisies et expliqués par Paul Valéry (Paris: 
Corrêa, 1941). 
  
the vehicle or inspiration for its project; that philosophy must stop trying to follow 
science—stop being its ancilla, or maidservant—and realise itself in a ‘new ca-
reer’, as a ‘poetic genre’ (Cartesius 50, 45). Descartes matters because, once the 
map of philosophical system has perished, a novel or romance remains. 
 
Romans des cartes 
Then again, maybe it is not quite a matter of discarding the map. Insofar as it was 
always a ‘manifestation of his essential ambition and of his way of satisying it’ 
(‘Une vue’ 750), we still have to read through the map of system, and perhaps what 
we find is not so much a remainder of romance as a certain roman des cartes. This, 
at any rate, is what Derrida seems to suggest in his paper of 1984, ‘Les romans de 
Descartes ou l’économie des mots’.23 In a letter to Mersenne, Descartes rejects a 
project for a universal language, proposed by a certain Hardy, as fit to be proposed 
only in ‘le pays des romans’ (Les romans’ 324). After a winding analysis—setting 
Descartes’s advice, that we should read the Principes a first time cursorily, as we 
would read a romance, alongside his seemingly contradictory dismissal of the ‘ex-
travagances des paladins de nos romans’ (Discours 85)—Derrida arrives back at ‘le 
pays des romans’, quoted in full under the rubric ‘Conclusion, donc:’. The conclu-
sion that Derrida draws is that the land of romance has become the land of good 
                                                 
23 Jacques Derrida, Du droit à la philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 1990), 311-41. 
  
science: ‘La carte de ce pays romanesque aurait quelque analogie, si même elle ne 
se confondait pas avec la carte de la rationalité méthodologique, celle de l’ordre et 
du chemin devenu méthode’ (‘Les romans’ 339-40). Derrida then sets to work on 
the two possible modes of universal language posited by Descartes: one absolutely 
natural, the other absolutely artificial. What these have in common is that they 
would alike render method redundant. It is thus between the two, in the failure of 
each, that method becomes an imperative, or a task: ‘Entre les deux, il y à la 
méthode à construire et il y a l’histoire’ (‘Les romans’  341). It is, one might con-
clude, not only for Descartes that there is method thus negatively, in the sense of 
something that it remains to construct; that only dreams that it follows the map of a 
road already ‘devenu méthode’; and that follows thus the chart of a romantic pro-
jection.  
I do not have the space here, in this essay, to trace all the windings of the 
‘carte’ (as of the trace and the écart) in the seminars on The Beast and the Sover-
eign, through ‘l’angoisse du chemin et de la cartographie à frayer’, in this world 
which is an island ‘dont nous ne connaissons pas la carte’ (Bête II 95, 101).24 Suf-
fice it to say that Heidegger’s desire to escape the circle of metaphysics by pro-
ceeding ‘pas comme Descartes’—posing the question of the way or road, but not 
as ‘procédé calculable’ (Bête II 64-65)—leads him in Descartes’s footsteps. This 
                                                 
24 Jacques Derrida, La Bête et le souverain II (Paris: Gelilée, ), p.64. 
  
may be because he is ‘a philosopher of wandering who does not want to wander’ 
(Bête II 67-8). But, more fundamentally, it is because there is no way out (issue) of 
this ‘paysage robinsonnien’ (Bête II 71). Robinson Crusoe seems to function 
throughout this seminar as a sort of alternative to the Cartesian; he is the exem-
plum of one who is constantly having to decide on the best road because ‘il n’a pas 
de carte’ (Bête II, p.81). But as their names, adjectives and functions mingle pro-
miscuously (Bête II 64, 89), one might as well say their difference marks an écart 
in a singular topos, making it impossible to decide which is really the simulacrum 
of the other. And this game of masks is one way of tracing how Derrida marks his 
own difference; which cannot, for reasons we have already discussed, simply 
amount to discarding Descartes as Heidegger does. 
 
Le Maître hors d’anciens calculs 
Derrida’s own career may be read as one long attempt to place himself, as one 
might say in French, ‘hors de ses repères’. But none of his strategies for losing 
himself ever go without ‘re-pères’. From the very start,  it seems. Tantalisingly, 
one of Derrida’s earliest recorded errances concerns his treatment of Descartes in 
his agrégation examination of 1955. In a letter reproduced by Benoît Peeters, Mau-
rice Gandillac relays the view of his colleagues, that Derrida ‘seemed to get Des-
  
cartes completely wrong’.25 In what precise manner, one wonders, did the young 
Derrida’s Descartes err? At any rate, the programmatic imperative to err, and to err 
ever better, whose itinerary and stages are retrospectively set out in ‘Ponctuations: 
le temps de la thèse’, sometimes takes on Cartesian tonalities. Thus Derrida rec-
ords his reply to Jean Hyppolite’s remonstrance, in 1966, that he did not see where 
he was going: ‘Si je voyais clairement, et d’avance, où je vais, je crois bien que je 
ne ferais pas un pas de plus pour m’y rendre’.26 This desire to not see ‘clearly and 
in advance’ is Descartes minus the assurance of method as the one true path; but 
not minus all assurance. As he sets out to leave the common highway (s’écarter du 
chemin commun), Derrida may not hope, as Descartes says he does, to find ‘le sen-
tier qu’il faut prendre pour aller plus droit’; but neither, surely, does he hope to be 
one of those who remain ‘égarés toute leur vie’ (Discours 91). This latter fate must, 
to be sure, be part of the mise en jeu, and herein lies the ‘angoisse [...] de la car-
tographie à frayer’. But he surely does not set out without a certain step. This may 
not be quite the same step as ‘le cavalier Descartes “qui partit d’un si bon pas”’ 
(Du droit 294).27  Then again, is there not already something a little cavalier in the 
claim to be able to lose onself in the first place; to be able to dispense with setting 
out ‘la carte, le parcours et les étapes’ in advance (Bête II 151-52)? Maybe this is 
why Derrida, in the Beast and the Sovereign, makes such a point of setting out ‘the 
                                                 
25 Benoît Peeters, Derrida: A Biography trans. by Andrew Brown (London: Polity, 2013 
26 Jacques Derrida, ‘Ponctuations: le temps de la thèse’, in Du droit à la philosophie, p.442. 
27 The quotation, unattributed, is from Charles Péguy. 
  
map, the route and the stages’ of his seminars, and even invoking the methodologi-
cal reasons and precautions (Bête II 217, 231) which ensure that the phantasm 
‘sleepwalks’ in his approach (Bête II 244).28 
What is at stake here is not just the mastery claimed by method and its stu-
pidity, but also the mastery entailed by the claim or aspiration to escape or undo 
mastery. Perhaps the most tense moments of the seminars on The Beast and the 
Sovereign lie in those brief but incandescent pages denouncing Giorgio Agam-
ben’s mania for declaring himself the first to reveal who first thought such and 
such (Bête I 134-39), and his reliance on a zoê/bios opposition that was never ‘si 
claire et assuré’ as he claims (Bête I 420). These moments are, as I say, tense be-
cause, no matter how compelling one finds them—and I, for my part, am entirely 
convinced—they evince a polemical and legislative force that amounts in itself to a 
rather unguarded act of mastery. It is hard, indeed, not to see Derrida’s intervention 
as an act of gatekeeping, or even gamekeeping, guarding the animots of decon-
struction. Indeed, it would be hard to determine whether this is a just retort to 
Agamben’s insinuation, in Homo sacer, that deconstruction risks degenerating into 
a gatekeeper, or an instance of the danger.29 Whatever the case may be, the risk of 
the posture of mastery is, it seems, greatest where mastery itself is frontally at-
                                                 
28 Sleepwalking, from ‘Force et signification’ through Eperons, is the very mark of the unthinking unfolding 
of a programme. But in the late seminars, and indeed in Fichus, Derrida starts to assume the charge in 
the first person: ‘Je somnambule’. 
29 Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer: Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita (Turin: Einaudi, 1995/2005), p.63. 
  
tacked. 
This brings us back to the servile fetishists of the ‘maître [...] moi René Des-
cartes’. What is at stake here is a certain inscrutability. To Valéry’s idea that phi-
losophy is only written when it parts from the truth that speaks to say ‘me’ as close 
as possible to the source, Derrida remarks: ‘De ce propos comme de son simulacre, 
Descartes ici est exemplaire’ (‘qual quelle’ 350; emphasis mine). Where Descartes 
is concerned it is not a question of distinguishing between fully serious proposition 
and simulacrum; the hesitation is what is operative. For the same reason, it does 
not serve to know whether Descartes was the dupe or the master of his own ruse, or 
whether the traditional reading of the Cogito was his own: ‘sait-on jamais’, says 
Derrida in L’animal  (L’animal 188). You never know; and that is how it should 
be. This is the écart in ‘Descartes’, and we discard it at our peril, whether by pro-
claiming or denouncing the Cogito and its assurance. Either way the only prize is a 
humourless and always premature pose of mastery. Astonishingly, it seems that, 
more even than all the other writers Sarah Kofman calls Derrida’s ‘incontourna-
bles’—those he said he could not simply get around (Écarts 153)—Descartes may 
yet prove the most obstinate. 
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